In a saga that is equal parts farce and tragedy, an independent review has unearthed a series of errors behind lost Howard-era cabinet documents. 

The papers, including insights into Australia’s decision to join the Iraq war, were relegated to the dusty corners of bureaucracy, after an alleged series of administrative blunders.

Dennis Richardson, former defence department secretary, led the review, which was triggered by the discovery that 82 cabinet records from 2003 had been inadvertently hidden from public scrutiny. 

The cause turns out to be a “forgotten” box and a litany of errors surrounding it.

Initially, the COVID-19 pandemic was blamed for the missing files, supposedly part of a “major breakdown” in the transfer process of the Howard government's records. 

However, systemic issues, including a lack of staff experienced in record-management and a bewildering maze of security clearances and storage locations, meant the documents were unlikely to ever see the light. 

In a further twist, the inquiry finds that department staff, upon finally accessing a special security room, were met with several cabinets no one could open.
Key cabinet records were eventually located in a sealed envelope within the room.

“The material within the room holding cabinet records was poorly itemised, tailor-made for a mistake in a future transfer process from PM&C to the NAA,” the report says.

The bureaucratic tie-up has reignited calls for an independent inquiry into the 2003 decision to join the US-led invasion of Iraq. 

The details of this decision have been shrouded in secrecy, much to the chagrin of critics like former Defence Minister Robert Hill and Independent MP Andrew Wilkie, who resigned from the Office of National Assessments over the Iraq invasion.

Perhaps most damning is the revelation that the key justification for war, Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction, was based on intelligence that was “thin, ambiguous and incomplete”.
One document shows that the full cabinet signed off on the decision to send Australia to war on 18 March 2003 based on “oral reports by the prime minister”.

This, coupled with the fact that the National Security Committee documents, which underpin this decision, were largely missing from the released material, paints a picture of a government more interested in following allies into war than in robust, transparent decision-making.

Amidst this administrative chaos, Richardson’s report does offer a glimmer of hope, making recommendations to overhaul the archival process and ensure future transparency. 

The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet has accepted all recommendations.

As the National Archives gears up to review these newly-found documents, there is hope that the episode serves as a cautionary tale. 

It certainly shows the need for robust, accountable record-keeping in government, ensuring that crucial decisions are not just made in the light of day, but also remembered and scrutinised in the full glare of history.

The review report is accessible here.